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Res Ipsa Loquitur in Hospital and
Malpractice Cases
Julien C. Renswick*
T HE EXPERIENCE IN OHIO, the first few years after Avellone,
has shown that though hospitals may now be subject to
liability for ordinary negligence to patients, successful recovery
against hospitals for such negligence is almost as infrequent as
it was before Avellone. Perhaps the biggest single obstacle to re-
covery is the almost universal reluctance of physicians to testify
in cases against hospitals. The same reasons that militate against
their testifying in malpractice cases seem to prevail here. As well,
plaintiff's counsel are beginning to discover that juries tend to
be more sympathetic to hospitals as a group than to most other
classes of defendants. This is particularly the case where the
hospital is under the control of some religious organization.
Perhaps the most difficult problem confronting a plaintiff's
attorney is his inability to secure witnesses who can or will
testify in court about the origin of his client's injury. Most
typically, the injury produced by the hospital's negligence occurs
at a time when the plaintiff is unable to comprehend what is
going on around him, either by reason of the fact that he is un-
conscious from drugs or sedation, or by reason of the fact that
the illness or injury which was responsible for his hospital con-
finement has so dulled his senses that he is incapable of later rec-
ollecting what happened to him. Any other persons about at
the time of plaintiff's injury are usually not friendly to him when
he sues. I should like to recite the facts of a recent case of mine
as an example of the above.
The plaintiff entered a downstate Ohio hospital as a patient
of an orthopedic surgeon in that community because of severe
distress which he was suffering in his low back. After several
days of unsuccessful conservative treatment, the surgeon decided
to perform a laminectomy. Prior to the operation the plaintiff
Was in perfect health save for his low back difficulty. Plaintiff
was given an anesthetic as he was leaving his room for the
operating room, became unconscious shortly after and remained
in that unconscious state for about three hours, during which
time he was operated on, placed in a recovery room and returned
back to his own room before regaining consciousness. Im-
mediately after coming out from under his anesthetic in his own
room, plaintiff noticed that he had a crescent shaped laceration
on his upper right cheek, which ended at the outer corner of
his right eye, as well as redness in and irritation and tearing
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of that eye. Plaintiff subsequently developed an ulcer in that
right eye, requiring treatment for the period of approximately
one month, and as an aftermath was left with a permanent corneal
scar in the eye. Plaintiff had no idea of the origin of the scratch
on his face other than a dim recollection that as he was in the
process of coming out of his anesthetic in his hospital room he
felt the sharp edge of what appeared to be a plastic pillow case
over his pillow, at about eye level.
The plaintiff, at the time that he was first aware of the in-
jury to his right cheek and right eye, had no idea of the precise
manner in which this injury was inflicted. Three years later,
at the time of trial, he still had no idea as to the precise manner
in which that laceration occurred. During that period of time
when the incident took place, while plaintiff was unconscious,
there was no friendly witness who could assist the plaintiff in
explaining the cause of this injury. Every other person in a posi-
tion to know how this happened was either an employee of one
of the defendants or a defendant himself.
Suit for plaintiff's injuries was filed jointly against the hos-
pital, the surgeon and the anesthetist.
Though by the discovery process available in this state it
was possible to identify most of the persons who exercised some
control over the plaintiff from the time that he left his hospital
room to go down to surgery until he regained consciousness
several hours later, none of these witnesses who were available
for deposition were able to throw any light on the origin of
plaintiff's facial and eye injuries. Several of these witnesses were
no longer in the jurisdiction. Those who could be deposed, in
most instances said they could remember only what they saw
on written records of the hospital and physicians. We were en-
countering the difficulties characteristic of the situation where
one must make his case with his adversary's witnesses.
Therefore, it became obvious that the only way in which
plaintiff could hope to get his case to a jury was by use of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur against all defendants. The injury
involving plaintiff's face and eye was a portion of his anatomy
far removed from the site of his laminectomy. The nature of
the injury indicated that it was the type of injury which ordinarily
would not occur but for someone else's negligence.
Had all of the persons in whose charge plaintiff had been
just prior to, during and after the operation been employees of
the hospital, there would be no question of the applicability of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, in this state or in any other
common law jurisdiction. Here, however, the plaintiff was for
some period of time under the control of the operating surgeon.
This surgeon was clearly not in the general employ of the hospital
and was in all probability an independent contractor. As well,
there was in attendance during the course of the operation an
anesthetist who likewise was not in the general employ of the
hospital who may have exercised some control over the plaintiff
during the period of his unconsciousness. Therefore, at least two
defendants and perhaps three had to be named in order to fully
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include all of the persons, either as principals or agents, who
had any charge over the plaintiff during that period of time when
his injuries must have occurred.
Most legal texts state as a matter of law that in order to
apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur it is required that plain-
tiff show that the instrumentality causing his injury was in the
continuous and exclusive control of one defendant. This general
proposition has been stated in Ohio on several occasions. How-
ever, in the last few years some exceptions to this general rule
have been established in several jurisdictions.
For example, some courts have held that a passenger in a
carrier, who is injured by reason of a collision between the carrier
and another vehicle, may sue both under the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. 1 A similar result has been permitted by some courts in
claims arising out of the collision of two airplanes.2 Some courts
have permitted claimants to employ res ipsa against several de-
fendants where the injury has been caused by the explosion of
a bottle of beverage. 3 Where the claimant has been injured by a
falling object coming from an area of construction on which
several contractors have been simultaneously working, the ap-
plication of res ipsa against multiple defendants has been once
more allowed.4 And, most significantly for our purposes, courts
have permitted application of this doctrine against multiple de-
fendants where the claimant sustained his injuries while a pa-
tient at a hospital.
The landmark case is Ybarra vs. Spangard.5 There the plain-
tiff, while a patient at defendant hospital, sustained injury to his
shoulder while undergoing an appendectomy. At the time that
the injury occurred plaintiff was unconscious. A suit was filed
against the hospital, two doctors, and two nurses all of whom
had custody over the plaintiff at some time during the period
of his unconsciousness. The California Supreme Court affirmed
plaintiff's right to invoke res ipsa against all of the named de-
fendants, holding that where a patient received unusual in-
juries while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment,
all of those defendants who had any control over his body or
the instrumentalities which may have caused his injuries could
1 Jackson v. Capital Transit Co., 72 W. L. R., 718 (D. C. Mun. App.) 38 A
2d 108 (1944); Osgood v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 137 Cal. 280, 70 P 169
(1902); Cox v. Scott, 104 N. J. Law 371, 140 N. E. 390 (1928).
2 Smith v. O'Donnell, 215 Cal. 714, 12 P 2d 933 (1932).
3 Claxton Coco Cola Bottling Co. v. Coleman, 68 Ga. App. 302, 22 S. E. 2d
768 (1944); Nichols v. Nold, d. b. a. Pepsi Cola Co., 174 Kan. 613, 258 P
2d 316, (1953); Lock v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93 A 2d 451 (1953).
4 Schroeder v. City and County Savings Bank, 293 N. Y. 370, 57 N. E. 2d
57, (1945), Meany v. Carlson, 6 N. J. 82, 77 A 2d 248.
5 Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P 2d 687, 162 A. L. R. 1258 (1944);
Noted, 25 B. U. L. R. 295 (1944), 33 Cal. L. R. 331 (1944), 18 So. Cal. L. R.
310 (1944). As to subsequent proceedings see Comment, 63 Harv. L. R.
643 (1950).
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properly be called on to meet the inference of negligence by giv-
ing an explanation of their conduct.
The California Court had the following to say on page 689:
As pointed out above, if we accept the contention of de-
fendants herein, there will rarely be any compensation for
patients injured while unconscious. A hospital today con-
ducts a highly integrated system of activities, with many
persons contributing their efforts. They may be, for example,
preparation for surgery by nurses and interns who are em-
ployees of the hospital; administering of an anesthetic by a
doctor who may be an employee of the hospital, an em-
ployee of the operating surgeon, or an independent con-
tractor; performance of an operation by a surgeon and as-
sistants who may be his employees, employees of the hos-
pital, or independent contractors, and post-surgical care by
the surgeon, a hospital, physician and nurses. The number
of those in whose care the patient is placed is not a good
reason for denying him all reasonable opportunity to recover
for negligent harm. It is rather a good reason for re-exami-
nation of the statement of legal theories which supposedly
compel such a shocking result.
The doctrine of the Ybarra case has been followed on a num-
ber of subsequent occasions, both in California and elsewhere."
There are several reasons, express or implicit, given in the
above cases for extending the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to
multiple defendants when plaintiff is injured undergoing surgery
or treatment in a hospital.
The first is that in each of these above cases the plaintiff
was unconscious, either from the application of drugs, or so near
to unconsciousness from excruciating pain that he was himself
unable to give any explanation of the cause of his injury. It
appears from the examination of the above opinions that had
anyone of those plaintiffs been conscious at the time of his in-
jury and able to tell for himself what happened to him the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur would most certainly not have been
applied.
The second reason is that plaintiff either paid or was obli-
gated to pay for the services performed by the defendants when
he placed himself in their custody. Just as in the above cited
cases, where courts have permitted the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to apply against multiple defendants for injuries sus-
tained by passengers of carriers involved in collision with other
vehicles, the court here apparently concludes that if a custodian
0 Cavero v. Franklin General Benevolent Society, et al., 36 Cal. 2d 301,
223 P 2d 471 (1950), noted 24 So. Cal. L. R. 324 (1950); Bowers v. Olch,
120 Cal. App. 2d, 108, 260 P 2d 997 (1953); Oldis v. La Societe Francaise de
Bienfaisance Mutuelle, 130 Cal. App. 2d 461, 279 P 2d .84 (1955); Diermann
v. Providence Hospital, 179 P 2d 603, (Cal., 1947); Frost v. Des Moines
Still College of Osteopathy and Surgery, 248 Iowa 29, 79 N. W. 2d 306 (1956).
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of an injured person is being paid by that person for services,
that by virtue of the contract entered into between the injured
party and the custodian, the injured party requires a duty of
explanation from the custodian of the cause of injuries, to a
greater degree than in the case where there would be no con-
tract between the parties.
A third element is that the multiple medical defendants,
though having separate identities in that the operating physicians
and the anesthetists are ordinarily treated as independent con-
tractors rather than employees of the hospital, nevertheless have
an extremely close relationship with each other and the hospital
in the care and treatment they jointly perform on behalf of the
plaintiff-patient. The operating doctor is extended staff privi-
leges at the hospital only after being rigidly screened by hospital
officials. The privilege to use the hospital facilities is not afforded
to all physicians.7 Frequently a doctor has operating privileges
at but one hospital, and seldom more than a very few. Likewise,
the anesthetist typically limits his services to a small number
of hospitals. During the course of an operation, aside from the
operating physician and the anesthetist, there are usually nurses
present who are in the general employ of the hospital. The busi-
ness of taking a patient from his room to the site of the opera-
tion, thence to the recovery room, and thence to his own room
is a highly complex operation which requires the closest of co-
operation and coordination among physicians and the hospital.
Therefore, one does not find that separateness and independence
of operation which ordinarily characterizes independent con-
tractors or the activity of most joint tort feasors who are sued
jointly as defendants.8
Another factor is that if all of the named defendants to-
gether constitute all of the persons who exercised any control
over the person of the plaintiff during that period of time that he
was injured, then collectively they have the power to rebut the in-
ference created by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. To explain
this more fully we ought to digress for a moment to touch upon
the significance of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the trial of
a lawsuit.
In Ohio, as in most of the jurisdictions, the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur does not raise a presumption of negligence but
merely permits an inference of negligence. It is solely an evi-
dential inference for the consideration of the jury, and the jury
may give this inference as much or as little weight as it deems fit.
Therefore, even if the plaintiff has presented in his case in
chief sufficient evidence to warrant the application of res ipsa
loquitur, the defendants in their case in chief have the oppor-
7 See, Perr, Hospital Privileges Revisited, 9 Clev-Mar. L. R. 137 (1960).
8 See, McCoid, Negligence Actions Against Multiple Defendants, 7 Stan.
L. R. 480 (1955).
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tunity to rebut that inference by coming forward with evidence
to show that they had no connection with the claimed injury.
As indicated above, where an injury occurs to plaintiff-pa-
tient while undergoing surgery or treatment by a hospital em-
ployee or doctors, the only witnesses to the injury are necessarily
either the defendants themselves or employees of the defendant.
If they are innocent of responsibility for the injury, then they
have full opportunity to rebut the inference by bringing those
persons before the court and jury to testify as to their innocence.
This is pointed out in a very fine article written by Pro-
fessor Louis J. Jaffe of Harvard Law School, entitled Res Ipsa
Loquitur Vindicated.9 Professor Jaffe writes that, though it is
usually required for res ipsa loquitur that the defendant be in
control of the mischief-working instrumentality, such control
should not be a condition for applying the doctrine. Rather (on
page 6) he says:
The determining factor should be the defendant's power-
if not in the very case, at least in the class of case in ques-
tion-to rebut the adverse inference. Control is relevant but
not necessary. Control is in any case a hopelessly ambiguous
concept ...
Where the defendants, the hospital and doctors, together have
control over plaintiff during the entire period of time in which
his injury must have occurred, they possess the power to ex-
plain the cause of the injury. If they are able to do so, let them
come forward with their witnesses to explain it away. If they
cannot, having the power to explain and being unable to do so,
it is minimum justice that the inference be permitted to go to
the jury, which may or may not find a verdict for the plaintiff.
A final word ought to be said about the practical effect of
the application of this doctrine as relates to presentation of testi-
mony to the jury in this type of case.
If this doctrine is not applied, then plaintiff's counsel, in order
to try to get his case to the jury, must bring forward agents of
the defendants themselves as his witnesses in his case in chief
in an effort to establish how the plaintiff's injury occurred. Even
under the recent change in the Ohio Code, which permits for the
first time cross-examination of defendant's agents, 10 it is the al-
most universal experience of plaintiffs' attorneys that this method
of producing evidence is far less satisfactory than cross-exami-
nation of the same witness after defendant's counsel has first
examined this witness directly. As Professor Jaffe points out in
the above-cited article, being able to ask an opponent questions
is inferior to the right to compel him to "make on his own
initiative a full accounting." 11
9 1 Buffalo L. R. I (1951-2).
10 Ohio Rev. Code, § 2317.52.
11 1 Buffalo L. R. p. 14, supra, n. 7.
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The most significant difference is that the witness, who must
first make a full accounting in direct examination before being
cross-examined by opposing counsel, somehow develops a much
finer memory of the facts surrounding the matters about which
he testifies than does the same witness who is brought forward
solely on cross-examination. My own experience has been that
among hospital employees there seems to be a tendency, where
such witness is cross-examined on deposition or on trial, to give
the same pat answer to all of the important questions concern-
ing the alleged injury, to-wit: "I have seen so many patients
around the hospital that I just can't remember one from the
other." The witness who cannot remember is useless to the at-
torney who must establish a prima facie case.
But when the inference of res ipsa loquitur permits plain-
tiff's counsel to get his case to the jury without first being com-
pelled to make his case from the testimony of hostile witnesses,
it then becomes the duty of counsel for the defendants to bring
forward witnesses of their own who will affirmatively testify to
facts that will tend to rebut the inference. It is amazing to see
the improvement in the memory of these hostile witnesses when
they are asked to testify on behalf of their employer.
Even when these hostile witnesses testify in defendants' case
in chief unfavorably to the plaintiff, the mere fact that these
witnesses have affirmatively committed themselves to an account
of how the injury occured, gives plaintiff's counsel an oppor-
tunity to effectively use his arts of cross-examination in a manner
that counsel never can where the witness claims to be ignorant
of the matters about which he is being questioned.
It is evident that the duty of explanation put upon the de-
fendants by virtue of the application of res ipsa loquitur is likely
to insure that a greater degree of probative evidence will be
placed in the jury's hands before the close of the case. The
greater the number of facts presented to the jury, the more like-
lihood that the ultimate truth will be reached by the jury in their
verdict. Hence it is our belief that the use of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur in cases of this kind is more than apt to result in a
just and correct verdict in the vast majority of cases.
In the State of Ohio, the Supreme Court has not yet been
compelled to decide the specific issue raised by the Ybarra case.
However, on several occasions Supreme Court and lower court
opinions have stated that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ap-
plies only where the instrumentality producing injury to the
plaintiff was under the exclusive control and management of a
single defendant.12
Recently there was dicta in the case of Schutts v. Siehl, et
12 City of Cleveland v. Amato, 123 Ohio St. 575, 176 N.E. 227 (1931) (res
ipsa loquitur held not applicable in suit against municipality for injuries
due to failure of proper care and maintenance of a manhole cover since
evidence showed several other persons had equal control over such man-
hole); Koktavy v. United Fireworks, 160 Ohio St. 461, 117 N. E. 2d 16 (1954)
(Continued on next page)
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al.13 to the effect that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could
not be applied to a hospital and to a physician jointly. In the
above case there was some considerable doubt as to the precise
time when plaintiff's alleged injury took place, and there was
strong evidence that such injury may very well have occurred
after plaintiff had left the hospital where he was confined at the
time that the second defendant performed his work upon him.
Therefore there was a strong possibility that plaintiff was not
still in the control of the defendants at the time his injury origi-
nated.
In spite of the language in the above cases, one cannot say
with certainty that the Ohio Supreme Court would refuse to
adopt the Ybarra rule, since none of the previously mentioned
decisions in the State have dealt with the precise set of facts we
are here concerned with, to-wit: an unconscious plaintiff who
while unconscious sustains injury of the sort not likely to have
occurred but for the negligence of some third party or parties
during the time that he was under the control of several named
defendants, whose collective control covered the entire period
of time he must have received his injury. The application of
the Ybarra doctrine would not be inconsistent with any of the
above cited decisions in Ohio.
If the Ybarra doctrine is adopted by Ohio, no rash of plain-
tiffs' verdicts against hospitals and doctors need be anticipated.
Defendants have full opportunity to rebut the inference by pre-
senting their account of the way in which the plaintiff was in-
jured. Any witnesses to the occurrence are most certainly going
to be more sympathetic to the defendants than to the plaintiff.
Defendants may still rely upon the generally sympathetic at-
titude expressed by jurors to date in cases against hospitals and
physicians. These defendants may still count upon the reluctance
of medical doctors to testify against hospitals, even in those cases
where the source of the injury was from administrative rather
than professional error. It is safe to conclude that the vast
majority of cases involving injuries sustained by patients in
hospitals still would be lost if tried before a civil jury.
But the adoption of the rule of res ipsa loquitur to the situa-
tion described herein fairly permits recovery in some few cases
where otherwise the fact of the plaintiff's unconsciousness at the
time of his injury would bar recovery.
(Continued from preceding page)
(res ipsa loquitur not applicable to manufacturer of fireworks where evi-
dence showed that there was extensive handling by others before the
ultimate use by the consumer); Brown v. Pennsylvania Greyhound, 29
Ohio Op. 442, (C. P., 1945) (doctrine not applicable where injuries in-
curred by reason of collision of two vehicles); Curry v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., 67 Ohio L. A. 569, 119 N. E. 2d 142 (1954) (res ipsa
loquitur not proper for injuries resulting from explosion of bottle where
petition on its face indicated such explosion was likely the result of mis-
handling by retailer).
13 109 Ohio App. 145 (1959).
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